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THE MASTER'S TOOLS: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
AND TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE
CONTRACTING/COMPACTING
Danielle A. Delaney *
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) of 1975, the goal was to create
mechanisms of tribal self-governance through the process of
government contracting.1 By contracting funds to tribal
governments used by federal agencies via the government contracts
process, the federal government could turn over those funds to the
tribal governments to manage contracted programs as they saw fit
and thus provide tribes greater control over their socio-economic
situation.2 On a number of metrics, ISDEAA is an enormous
success. More than 60% of tribal programs are administered through
self-governance contracting/compacting.3 Tribal self-governance
contracting/compacting has significantly raised American Indian
and Alaska Native (AI/AN) health outcomes, standards of living,

*

Ph.D. candidate, University of Wisconsin-Madison 2018; J.D., Georgetown
University Law Center; M.A. in Political Science University of Wisconsin, May
2012.
1
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 22.02 at 1386 (2012)
[Hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
2
See President Richard Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, H.R. Doc.
No. 91-363, 1970. The Nixon Administration did not originate the idea of
manipulating the government process is in this manner. The idea began with the
Kennedy Administration in response to a document released by the National
Congress of American Indians (NCAI) titled “Declaration of Indian Purpose” in
1961, which decried the state of BIA controlled reservations and the lack of selfdetermination for AI/AN governments. The Johnson Administration initiated a
series of demonstration programs which the Nixon Administration then used a
blueprint for ISDEAA. Telephone Interview with Eric Eberhard, Professor of
Federal Indian Law at the University of Washington School of Law and former
legal counsel to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Nov. 11, 2015). See
further, THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS, at 1961-1969 (2001).
3
See U.S. Dep't of Interior, 2008 Annual Accountability Report (Sept. 2008);
see further, U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), “Highlights” in INDIAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GAO-04-847 (Sept. 2004) available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243913.pdf.
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and education rates across tribal backgrounds.4 However, whether
ISDEAA empowers tribal sovereignty remains an open question—a
question with important policy implications for tribal governments.5
For example, tribal leadership in Tribal Budget Consultations
with various federal agencies continually demand the full
recognition of tribal sovereignty—recognition that federal agencies
like the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Indian Health
Service (IHS) continually elide by suggesting that ISDEAA
contracting/compacting with the tribes is the same, or functionally
equivalent to, the recognition of tribal sovereignty.6 Conflating tribal
sovereignty with tribal compacting/contracting under ISDEAA not
only ignores the demands of tribal leadership, but it also obscures
the legal innovation at the heart of ISDEAA.
This article charts the difference between the legal theories of
tribal
sovereignty
and
tribal
self-governance
contracting/compacting as argued for by tribal advocates.
Conflating tribal self-governance contracting/compacting with
tribal sovereignty ignores both the demands of tribal advocates and
the legal history of tribal self-governance contracting/compacting. I
present three interlocking arguments: (1) that ISDEAA tribal selfgovernance contracting/compacting was conceptualized and
designed by tribal advocates to be a mechanism inside the American
legal system, thus slightly removed from arguments on tribal
sovereignty which tribal advocates argue stands outside the
framework of United States Federal law; (2) that tribal selfgovernance contracting/compacting was, and continues to be, a
practical strategy on the part of tribal advocates to provide for the
needs of their communities, while tribal sovereignty is an ideal for
which they continue to fight; and, (3) that tribal self-governance
contracting/compacting cannot be considered an act of tribal
sovereignty unless such claims are understood in fundamentally
different—and lesser—terms than demanded by tribal advocates. 7
See JOSEPH P. KALT, ET. AL., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS
UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, The Harvard Project on
American Indian Economic Development (2008).
5
See generally KEVIN BRUYNEEL, THE THIRD SPACE OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
POSTCOLONIAL POLITICS OF U.S.-INDIGENOUS RELATIONS (2007).
6
See President’s FY2017 Indian Country Budget: Hearing on S. 1392 Before
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Lawrence
Roberts, Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs) (referring to tribal selfgovernance contract/compacting as a recognition of “Tribal Nation-Building).
7
But see supra note 5 (arguing that ISDEAA was part of the post-colonial re4

311

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

Some tribal governments and organizations have remained
skeptical of tribal self-governance contracting/compacting as a
vehicle for meaningful tribal self-determination. These tribes argue
that tribal self-governance contracting represents an abrogation of
tribal treaty rights, and instead insist upon the direct federal
provisioning of programs promised under treaty rights. These tribes
are referred to within federal agency policy papers as “direct-service
tribes.”8 Federal agencies argue that Ramah Navajo School Board
Inc. v Babbitt 87.F3d 1338, a case against the Bureau of Indian
Affairs for failure to pay the full contract support costs of Navajo
Nation's education self-governance contract, demonstrate that tribal
self-governance contracting has the double effect of removing the
federal treaty responsibility while at the same time shifting the
burden of those treaty obligations onto the tribes themselves.9 These
tribes insist upon the fulfillment of the treaties between their
individual tribes and the United States government on the grounds
that anything else ignores their sovereignty as tribal nations. The
Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association has continually insisted
upon the observation of treaty rights before tribal self-governance
conceptualization of tribal sovereignty within the colonial bounds of US federal
law. He further argues that tribal exercise of self-governance
contracting/compacting constitutes as “third space of sovereignty.”); but see
further, Rebecca Tsosie & William Coffey, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty
Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations,
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 191 (2001) (locating tribal self-governance
contracting within a general legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty and arguing for
its use to develop a culturally grounded theory of tribal sovereignty).
8
The BIA and IHS refer to these tribes as “direct-service” because the BIA and
IHS provide services directly to the tribes opposed to forming self-determination
contracts or compacts under ISDEAA with them. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE CIRCULAR NO. 2005-03, DIRECT
SERVICE TRIBES ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHARTER (2005) available at
https://www.ihs.gov/ihm/index.cfm?module=dsp_ihm_circ_main&circ=ihm_cir
c_0503.
9
The Ramah line of cases are an important piece of case law for tribal selfgovernance contracting/compacting revolving around federal government
obligations to pay full contract support costs in ISDEAA contracts. The Ramah
cases were recently settled for $940 million after the Supreme Court ruled for
Navajo Nation in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, finding that the agencies
must pay full support costs even if Congress had not appropriated those costs.
The settlement was finalized January 20, 2016; thus, the full impact of that
settlement remains unclear (see Ramah Settlement Funds Finally Released by
Obama Administration, INDIANZ (August 11, 2016); Interior, Justice
Departments Announce $940 Million Landmark Settlement with Nationwide
Class of Tribes and Tribal Entities, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (September 17,
2015); Renee Lewis, Feds to Pay $940 to Settle Claims over Tribal Contracts,
AL JAZEERA (September 17, 2015).

2017]

The Master’s Tools

312

contracting/compacting in United States funding and legislative
priorities.10 This power - inequality, they argue- not only makes the
concept of tribal sovereignty through tribal self-governance
contracting/compacting inherently flawed, but is also deeply
insulting to the dignity of tribal nations.
Other tribal governments, most prominently Navajo Nation and
Jamestown S'Klallam, argue that while the legal theory and
execution of tribal self-governance contracting/compacting are not
ideal, the use of government contracting has been the most
successful legal mechanism for the preservation of tribal selfdetermination rights to date.11 Self-governance tribes point to new
methods of enforcing federal tribal consultation provisions, the
ability to tailor programs for tribal needs, and the general increase
in living standards for AI/AN peoples. White papers released by
Self-Governance Communication and Education (SGCE)—a tribal
think-tank on self-governance issues— make similar criticisms as
the ones made by the Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Association,
but argue that tribal self-governance contracting remains the best
current mechanism for tribal-federal negotiations.12 The Papers also
distinguish tribal self-governance contracting from tribal
sovereignty, but argue as a practical matter expanding ISDEAA
contracting/compacting must guide federal funding priorities.13
The Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association (GPTCA) is an organization
formed by the tribal leadership of South and North Dakota, Montana, Nebraska,
and Iowa. GPTCA represent the leadership of the largest proportion of ‘directservice’ tribes in the country. GPTCA provides member tribes with lobbying,
policy, and legal support; see United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
Oversight Hearing: “Youth Suicide in Indian Country” Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of Robert Moore, Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Chairman); United States Cong. House Subcommittee on Interior,
Environment, and Related Agencies, American Indian and Alaska Native Public
Witness Hearings on the Fiscal Year 2017, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of
John Yellow Bird Steele, Chairman of Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s
Association).
11
Telephone Interview with Jim Roberts, Senior Policy Analysis, Portland Area
Health Board (Dec. 11, 2015).
12
See 2017-2019 National Tribal Self-Governance Strategic Plan, TRIBAL SELF
GOVERNANCE COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION CONSORTIUM, at 3,
http://www.tribalselfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/17-19-SG-StrategicPlan-online.pdf. The Self-Governance Communication and Education
organization is a non-profit organization that provides policy and technical
expertise to tribes who have, or are interested in entering into, ISDEAA selfdetermination contracts/compacts. The group undertakes limited lobbying work
and operates predominantly as the policy think-tank on tribal self-determination
contracting. See generally, http://self-gov.org.
13
Id.; see further, TSG Legislative Priorities for the 115th Congress, presented at
10
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Thus, tribal advocates are split between those who demand tribal
sovereignty and those who demand better and expanded
opportunities for tribal self-governance contracting. Or at least, this
dichotomy is the vision of intra-tribal politics that one gets reading
the policy papers from federal agencies. The reality of the situation
is more complex. Tribal governments struggle between the need to
solve the pressing problems facing their communities and the need
to continue to fight for the sovereign rights of their individual
nations. The federal agencies present a false dichotomy regarding
tribal politics and tribal choices—either a tribe accepts tribal
contracting/compacting as it stands with no contestation, or a tribe
has chosen to continue to fight for the full recognition of their
sovereignty and treaty rights.14 As a political reality, the divide
between 'direct-service tribes' and 'self-governance tribes' in terms
of concrete political action is not nearly so great as presented by
federal agencies.15 Nearly all tribes capable of entering into a selfgovernance contract/compact have done so for at least one or more
service or program previously administered by a federal agency. All
tribes struggle for the full recognition of their sovereign rights. The
idea that a tribe is either a 'self-governance tribe' – and thus
uncritically embraces ISDEAA–or is a 'direct service tribe' – and
thus rejects ISDEAA in favor of the ideal of substantive
sovereignty–is an oversimplification of AI/AN political reality.
Moreover, this either/or between ISDEAA or sovereignty both
obscures and, at the same time, perpetuates the assumption that selfgovernance contracting/compacting is an act of sovereignty.
2016 Tribal Self-Governance Annual Consultation Conference April 24, 2016;
see also, ACA/TSGAC Contract Support Costs and Other Current Topics
Webinar, November 11, 2016.
14
This dichotomy is evident in the way the BIA and IHS divide their approach
between “self-governance tribes” (meaning those tribes that engage in 638
contracting), and “direct-service tribes” (meaning those tribes that have not
engaged 638 contracting). The distinction is a false one after a little bit of
consideration because almost every tribe has entered at least one Title I, 638
contract or compact, but it is a division that both BIA and IHS reiterate in almost
every Tribal Budget Consultation and within their agency handbooks.
15
A common explanation deployed by both IHS and BIA for budget choices, the
lack of transparency with the development of budget documents, and for
problems around paying full contract support costs tends to be a “divide within
the Indian community” on budget priorities. See, The President’s Fiscal year
2013 Budget for Native Programs, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th
Cong. 2 (2012) (testimony of Yvette Roubideaux, director of Indian Health
Service); see also, The President’s Fiscal year 2014 Budget for Native
Programs, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. (2013) (testimony
of Yvette Roubideaux, director of the Indian Health Service).
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The debate around ISDEAA and its problems often centers
around tribal self-governance contracting as a sovereignty
mechanism. Understanding the difference between selfdetermination, self-governance and sovereignty is critical for
advocating effectively for tribal interests. Arguing for better and
more effective tribal contracts/compacts is not the same as
advocating for the sovereignty rights of tribes; moreover, advocating
for improvements to ISDEAA and tribal self-governance does not
preclude indigenous activists from working towards substantive
sovereignty for tribal communities.
Section two of this article provides a brief history of federal
Indian policy and its approach towards tribal sovereignty. Federal
Indian policy has changed radically multiple times over the course
of United States history and the development of key concepts are
often poorly understood—even by those tasked with its
implementation.16 Understanding how federal Indian policy has
developed is critical to understanding the current legal reality for
tribal governments. Building from that base, I argue in section three
that ISDEAA and '638-ing'17 are the foundation upon which modern
tribal self-determination and self-governance is understood within
the United States. In section four, I argue that tribal self-governance
contracts cannot be considered expressions of tribal sovereignty, nor
can they be considered a viable foundation for developing a legal
framework of tribal sovereignty. I conclude by arguing that even
with its problems and shortcomings, tribal self-governance
contracting/compacting are vital parts of the legal framework
protecting AI/AN communities and worth pursuing for tribal
communities. I argue that substantive sovereignty for tribal
communities cannot exist within the framework of United States
law, but must exist as an exception to Congressional plenary powers;
however, tribal self-governance and self-determination rights can
exist within the framework of United States law.

See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS 189-205 (2005) (describing ISDEAA as part of the turning point for
tribal self-determination, but also explaining difficulty educating non-Indians on
its application and meaning).
17
The process of entering into a tribal self-governance contract/compact is
commonly referred to as '638-ing' a service, program, or facility—such as a
hospital or clinic—after ISDEAA's public law number: Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (1975).
16
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IN UNITED
STATES FEDERAL LAW
The Marshall Court Sets the Frame: “Domestic, Dependent
Nations”

The idea of tribal sovereignty has a complicated history within
United States Federal law. Tribes have existed half inside and half
outside the framework of United States Federal law since the
founding of the country. As “domestic dependent nations”, tribal
governments have a right, in legal theory, to govern themselves
within their own boundaries since time immemorial and without
interference from the state or federal government. In practice, the
continued existence of tribes, their governments, and their lands
exists upon the sufferance of the United States Congress under the
plenary power doctrine.18 That is, the “Congress has the plenary
authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local selfgovernment which the tribes otherwise possess.”19 While legal
scholars have critiqued the plenary powers doctrine, the doctrine has
since evolved from the court's understanding that tribal sovereignty
must be limited such that they cannot “conflict with the interest of
the overriding sovereignty” of the United States.20 The sovereign
rights of tribal governments have been conditional since Worcester
v Georgia,21 where the Marshall Court held that:
The Indian nations have always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities retaining
their original natural rights as the undisputed
possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with
the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with
any other European potentate than the first
discoverer of the coast of the particular region
See STEPHEN PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 83-84 (2012); VINE
DELORIA & CLIFFORD LITTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983).
19
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1673(1978).
20
Id. at 56; see further VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LITTLE, TRIBES, TREATIES
AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (1999); see also Robert A. Williams,
Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 441
(1988) (extensively critiquing the Court's theory of tribal sovereignty in general
and the plenary powers doctrine in particular as “racist, eurocentric, and
genocidal”); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209, S.
Ct. 1011 (1978).
21
31 U.S. 515, 521 (1832).
18
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claimed, and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed upon themselves, as
well as themselves. The very term “nation,” so
generally applied to them, means “a people distinct
from others.” The Constitution, by declaring treaties
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned
the previous treaties with the Indian nations and
consequently admits their rank among those powers
who are capable of making treaties. The words
“treaty” and “nation” are words of our own language,
selected in our diplomatic and legislative
proceedings by ourselves, having each a definite and
well understood meaning. We have applied them to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations
of the earth.
Despite finding that the Indian nations were the same as “other
nations of the earth,” the Marshall Court held back from recognizing
them as equal to European nations and maintained the holding of
Cherokee Nation v Georgia.22 The Court in Cherokee Nation v
Georgia found that Indian nations required the protection of the
federal government—protection from other European nations or, as
in Worcester, from the states. The Marshall Court's holding created
an insecure framework where Indian tribes were, in theory, free from
the laws of both state and federal governments except for specific
treaties made with them—but that only the United States had the
right to make such treaties.23 Indian tribes embodied a removed
sovereignty, one lesser in statute than that of Western nation-states.
Tribal sovereignty, even in the formulation of a sympathetic
Marshall Court, was still a separate and lesser category. However,
the Court maintained throughout the Cherokee cases that only the
30 U.S. 1, 19 (1831).
Justice Marshall's doctrine of domestic dependent nations was in line with the
prevailing theory of “trusteeship” for non-European peoples that was popular
throughout the late nineteenth century. James Lorimer, a noted international law
scholar of the nineteenth century, argued “the right of undeveloped races, like
the right of undeveloped individuals, is a right not to recognition as what they
are not, but to guardianship, that is guidance—in becoming that, of which they
are capable, and in realizing their special ideals.” JAMES LORIMER, THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A TREATISE OF THE JURAL RELATIONS OF
SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES AT 157 (1883-1884). Justice Marshall's
holding in Worcester v Cherokee follows this line of legal reasoning and thus
sets tribal sovereignty from the beginning at a diminished status within the
American legal system.
22
23
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federal government itself could interfere with Indian tribes through
treaty—hypothetically maintaining the sovereignty of Indian
nations.24 Whether the Court was protecting the plenary powers of
Congress to deal with the tribes as it saw fit, or extending at least
some measure of respect for the sovereignty of the tribes is a matter
of ongoing legal argument.25
B.

Ending the Treaties: The Allotment and Assimilation Era
1871-1928

The shift between treaty-making between the United States and
the tribes and near-unilateral federal policy on the tribes—federal
policy focused forced assimilation culminating in the Dawes Act—
began shortly after the dust settled around the newly created federal
institutions. Treaties between the United States and various tribes
have guaranteed tribal control over lands, resources, and cultural
practices since the founding of the country. Unfortunately, treaty
promises have rarely been worth the paper they were written upon.
A steady erosion of tribal lands resulting from war, questionable
treaty negotiations, aggressive Congressional action against tribal
interests and the willful ignorance of Supreme Court decisions have
characterized federal-Indian relationships such that any actual
sovereign rights of Indian tribes were recognized only within the
courtroom and rarely outside it.
Once allotment began, the concept of tribal sovereignty - as
limited and stunted as it was within United States constitutional law
- became a complete legal fiction not even recognized in federal
legislation. The allotment and assimilation period of federal Indian
policy from 1871 to 1928 began with an unassuming congressional
budget rider stating:
That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
I say hypothetically because Worcester v Cherokee is also the case that proves
the fragility of Supreme Court cases because the cases where Andrew Jackson
publicly declared that the Court ought not “be permitted to control the Congress,
or the Executive.” The history of federal-Indian cases has been marked by a
tendency of federal agencies to ignore the rulings of the courts in favor of
abrogating tribal sovereignty. JILL NOGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: TWO
LANDMARK CASES IN THE FIGHT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AT 122-124 (2007).
25
The Court's holding in Worcester has been cited in both cases that uphold the
inviolability of tribal sovereignty, as in United States v Long, 324 F.3d 475 (7th
Cir), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 822 (2003) and in cases which asserted their
dependency and secondary status as in Oliphant.
24
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territory of the United States shall be acknowledged
or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or
power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty: Provided further, That nothing herein
contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair
the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made
and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.26
A brief two-line rider upon a budget bill effectively ended any
federal recognition of tribal sovereignty as a continuing legal
doctrine, and instead turned the tribes into “the Indian problem” to
be solved via federal programs to hasten their “civilization and
assimilation”.27 The General Allotment Act of 1887 was designed to
force tribes to participate fully in the American legal system via the
granting of individual property deeds.28 Assimilationist reformers of
federal Indian policy sought to develop programs that would ensure
the erasure of tribal communities, governments, and cultures
through establishment of agencies like the Courts of Indian
Offenses.29
In the face of federal policies determined to end their existence,
tribal governments continued to insist upon their sovereignty and
rights of self-determination. Even as the Bureau of Indian Affairs
was created, not to work with Indian tribes, but to manage their
assimilation, tribal leadership petitioned the federal government for
recognition of status as sovereign nations. As Robert Yellowtail, a
tribal leader from the Crow Tribe of Montana, stated before the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in 1919:
Mr. Chairman, it is peculiar and strange to me,
however, that after such elaborate and distinct
understandings [referring to treaties of 1880, 1882,
and 1904] it should develop that to-day, after over
half a century since our agreement, you have not
upon your statute books nor in your archives of law,
so far as I know, one law that permits us to think free,
act free, expand free, and to decide free without first
Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871 Ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)).
27
See FREDERICK F. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE
THE INDIANS 1880-1934 (1984)
28
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 71-72.
29
See WILLIAM HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN
ACCULTURATION AND CONTROL 135-138 (1966).
26
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having to go and ask a total stranger that you call the
Secretary of the Interior, in all humbleness and
humiliation, “How about this, Mr. Secretary, can I
have permission to do this?” and “Can I have
permission to do that”? Etc. Ah, Mr. Chairman, if you
had given us an inkling then what has since
transpired, I am sure that our fathers would have then
held their ground until every one of them were dead
or until you saw fit to guarantee to us in more explicit
assurances something more humane, something
more of that blessing of civil life, peculiar to this
country alone that you call “Americanism.”
Mr. Chairman, you President [Woodrow Wilson]
but yesterday assured the people of this great country
and also the people of the whole world, that the right
of self-determination shall not be denied to any
people, no matter where they live, no matter how
small or weak they may be, nor what their previous
conditions of servitude may have been. He has stood
before the whole world for the past three years at
least as the champion of the rights of humanity and
of the cause of the weak and dependent peoples of
this earth. He has told us that this so-called league of
nations was conceived for the express purpose of
lifting from the shoulder the burdened humanity this
unnecessary load of care. If that be the case, Mr.
Chairman, I shall deem it my most immediate duty
to see that every Indian in the United States shall do
what he can for the speedy passage of that measure,
but on the other hand, Mr. Chairman, this thought has
often occurred to me, that perhaps the case of the
North American Indians may never have entered the
mind of our great President when he uttered those
solemn words; that, perhaps, in the final draft of this
league of nations document a proviso might have
been inserted to read something like this: That in no
case shall this be construed to mean that the Indians
of the United States shall be entitled to the rights and
privileged expressed herein, or the right of selfdetermination, as it is understood herein, but that
their freedom and future shall be left subject to such
rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior
may, in his discretion, prescribe.30
The Allotment of Lands of the Crow Indians in Montana, Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, S. Rep. No. 19, 1919, 66th Cong. 1 (testimony of Robert
Yellowtail of the Crow Tribe of Montana) (Mr. Yellowtail was not a trained
30
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The rest of Robert Yellowtail's testimony goes on to explain that the
Crow Tribe was, in accordance to both United States legal theory
and by treaty, a sovereign nation and thus entitled to the rights of
self-governance and self-determination as proclaimed by the League
of Nations. His advocacy was both spirited and legally grounded. It
was also unsuccessful. Allotment came to the Crow Tribe of
Montana over their objections and stripped the tribe of nearly half
of their lands.31 Despite clear understanding of the governing legal
theories of self-governance, self-determination, and sovereignty as
they were understood not only within the United States, but also on
the international stage, Mr. Yellowtail was unable to convince the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to apply those same principles
to his tribe. The refusal of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
to apply the concept of sovereignty in its fullness to the Crow Tribe
marked not a divergence from federal Indian law, but a fulfillment
of it. From the Marshall Court forward, United States federal law
steadily diminished the conception of tribal sovereignty to subsume
tribal governance into the general United States legal framework.
Mr. Yellowtail's testimony is just one more moment in a history
where AI/AN governments are set aside as not really participating
in the same legal conceptions of self-rule applied to other
governments—whether state or federal. In the mind of the allotment
and assimilation era Congress, tribal sovereignty—the tribes
themselves— were a problem within United States federal law to be
solved, rather than a promise to be fulfilled.32
C.

The Indian Reorganization Act: A Brief Reprieve for Tribes

Mr. Yellowtail's testimony before the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs occurred in the middle period of federal Indian policy;
in fact, it was nearly a decade before federal Indian policy would
once again shift, this time towards a measure of respect for tribal
governments as governments. Congress first attempted to create
what Robert Yellowtail had noted as missing throughout the history

attorney, but rather an elected leader of the Crow Tribe).
31
See FREDRICK E HOXIE, TALKING BACK TO CIVILIZATION: INDIAN VOICES
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 136-138 (2001) (discussing the aftermath of Robert
Yellowtail’s testimony before Congress).
32
See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN
NATIONS 63-64 (2005) (describing development of the philosophies guiding the
Congressional policy of allotment and assimilation).
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of federal Indian law: a law upon the books which allowed tribal
governments some modicum of self-governance through the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). The text of the IRA explicitly
denied the sovereignty of tribal governments, and instead the Senate
Report on the bill referred to the Supreme Court language of
“domestic dependent nations” instead. The IRA was not even a
vehicle of self-determination for tribal governments as it was based
upon the (in)famous Meriam Report – which, despite underscoring
the need for reforming the BIA, continued to refer to AI/AN
communities as “the Indian Problem” and argued that eventually all
AI/AN communities would be fully assimilated into the majority
body politic.33 Moreover, this assimilation was an unqualified good:
“The national government can expedite the transition and hasten the
day when there will no longer be a distinctive Indian Problem and
when the necessary governmental services are rendered alike to
whites and Indians by the same organization without
discrimination.”34 Tribal sovereignty was never the goal of the IRA,
because that would have permanently set apart tribal communities
and make full assimilation an impossibility, but tribal selfgovernance was something allowable within the framework of
United States law.
The IRA did three critical things for the development of tribal
self-governance. First, it put an end to allotment and the shattering
of Indian lands. Second, it allowed tribal lands to either be held 'in
trust' by the federal government or to be reclaimed by tribal
governments. Finally, it created provisions for tribal communities to
develop federally recognized constitutions as implements of selfgovernance.35 Despite a string of Supreme Court cases recognizing
the nominal rights to sovereignty and self-governance of Indian
tribes, federal Indian policy until 1928 could only be categorized as
paternalistic and assimilationist.36 The IRA was an attempt to walk
See HOXIE, supra note 31; Wilkinson, supra note 32; see further American
Indian Policy Review Commission, A Policy for the Future, FINAL REPORT
(1977).
34
Lewis Meriam et al., Institute for Government Research, The Problem of
Indian Administration, THE MERIAM COMMISSION (1928).
35
See WILKINSON, supra note 32.
36
The American Indian Policy Review Commission of 1977 found that federal
Indian policy more often than not worked in complete opposition to Supreme
Court rulings. One of the main legal recommendations of the Commission was
that a federal agency be created with the explicit task of ensuring that federal
Indian policy remain compliant with both the trust responsibility and
constitutional law. See American Indian Policy Review Commission, A Policy
33
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the line between the assimilationist hopes of federal Indian policy
up until that point and the line of Supreme Court cases since
Worcester v Georgia in 1832, recognizing at the very least the selfgovernance rights of Indian tribes. The Indian Reorganization Act
was still a piece of paternalistic legislation, but it was the first piece
of federal legislation that recognized the self-governance capacity
of tribal governments.37 Tribal sovereignty was still a bridge too far,
but tribal governments saw the potential for at least some form of
recognition under the IRA and tried to push that potential.
The IRA can be seen as the first moment where federal Indian
policy embraced a theory of legal pluralism that incorporated tribal
governance into the American legal framework.38 The IRA was
intensely controversial both within the federal agencies and among
tribal governments.39 Those in the agencies were resistant to giving
up the assimilation ideals of the allotment period, and tribal
governments objected to the continuing requirement that the BIA
approve in writing any decision a tribal government might make.40
The IRA period was, unfortunately, just a brief respite from the
federal attacks on tribal governments. The end of World War II saw
the beginning of the termination and relocation era of federal Indian
policy, which have been the most destructive series of federal
policies for Indian communities since the founding of the nation.41
D.

Termination and Relocation: The Threat of Annihilation

The termination and relocation era (1943-1965) was heralded by
the release of the Survey of Conditions Among the Indians of the
United States, reporting results of a 15-year study on the status of

for the Future, FINAL REPORT (1977).
37
See Hoxie, supra note 31, at 30; see further, ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL
TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN
REORGANIZATION ACT 177-187 (2000).
38
See generally, DALIA T. MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX COHEN AND
THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (Cornell University Press, ed.
2007) (discussing the development of Felix Cohen's political philosophy and
theory of Indian law during and after the Indian Reorganization period).
39
Id.; see further, THEODORE H. HAAS, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL GOVERNMENT
UNDER THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT (1947) (detailing the concerns and
reservations within the federal agencies and their accusations of tribal
intransience towards full implementation of the IRA).
40
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 81.
41
Id. at 84-93; see further, ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE
UNITED STATES 349 (1970).

323

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

Indian people.42 The initial report was a complete rejection of any
theory of tribal sovereignty.43 It rejected the IRA approach to the
status and management of Indian lands. It rejected a pluralistic
vision of United States federal law that included tribal governments.
It further rejected the entire concept of tribal constitutions as a
fundamental threat to United States sovereignty. The report found
that Indian people lived in poverty, were unable to access the
benefits of the New Deal, and that jurisdictional issues prohibited
the economic development of Indian lands.44 It recommended
ending the federal-tribal trust relationship developed under the IRA
in favor of the complete assimilation of Indian people.45 The 1944
Mundt Report, developed by the House Committee on Indian
Affairs, reiterated these findings and recommended expedited
assimilation. 46 “Termination” was chosen over the more ominous
“liquidation,” but the final results were the same.
Throughout the 1940s, proposals were introduced to eliminate,
reduce, or substantially modify the IRA. Some of these changes
appeared to increase tribal self-governance as they extended the IRA
credit programs to all tribes beyond the original demonstration
programs; however, these proposals formed with the ultimate end of
terminating the federal-tribal relationship and ending any legal
pluralism formed under the IRA.47 Concurrent with these policies,
the BIA initiated the “Voluntary Relocation Program,” which was
aimed at relocating service-age American Indians and Alaska
Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Analysis of the
Statement of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Justification of
Appropriations of 1944, and the Liquidation of the Indian Bureau, S. Rep. No
78-310 (1943); S. Supp. Rep. 78-310 (1944) (hereinafter Survey of Conditions).
43
Id. at 36; see further, COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 85; TYLER
LYMAN, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 151-186 (1973).
44
Survey of Conditions, supra note 42; see generally, DONALD FIXICO,
TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960 (1986)
(discussing the legislative history of the termination and relocation policies postWWII).
45
Survey of Conditions, supra note 42.
46
See Investigate Indian Affairs: On H. Res. 166 (A Bill to Authorize and Direct
and Conduct an Investigation to Determine Whether the Changed Status of the
Indian Requires a Revision of the Laws and Regulations Affecting the American
Indian), 78th Cong. 1 and 2 (1943) [hereinafter H. Res 166 Hearings]. If any of
the members of the Committee found their choice of language alarmingly
similar to Nazi rhetoric regarding ‘the Jewish problem,’ it is not reflected in the
Congressional Record.
47
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 87; see also, Comm'n on
Organization of the Executive Branch of Govt., Indian Affairs: A Report to
Congress, H.R. DOC. NO 81-1 (1949).
42
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Natives returning from the war.48 Tribes faced programs that sought
to remove their lands from federal trust status, and placing them up
for sale to the general public on the one hand, and the relocation of
their members on the other. House Resolution 82-2503 of 1952 was
the capstone of termination and relocation.49 The resolution directed
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to conduct a complete
oversight investigation into BIA and IHS responsibilities to
formulate proposals “designed to promote the earliest practical
termination of all federal supervision and control over Indians.”50
Termination policies devastated tribal communities. They ended
federal programs for both tribes and individuals, introduced state
and local legislative jurisdiction over traditional tribal lands and
communities, and ended federal trusteeship over tribal and
individual lands. Most small tribes lost their entire landholdings in
short sales not designed to maximize Indian value placed in the
land.51 With the termination of the federal-tribal relationship, the
sale of tribal lands, and an end to Indian programs, many tribal
governments became increasingly dysfunctional and were unable to
exercise what few self-governance rights were left to them. In 1953,
Congress further complicated tribal self-governance capacity with
Public Law 280 (PL 280), which transferred criminal and civil
jurisdiction over some Indian lands to state governments that elected
to assume such responsibilities.52 The federal policies of the
termination and relocation era sought not just to extinguish what
lingering concepts of tribal sovereignty and self-governance that
might remain within United States federal Indian law, but to also
extinguish the very concept of Indians as a separate culture and
people.

Comm'r Ind. Aff., Ann. Rep. (1954), excerpted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 238 (Francis Paul Prucha, 3rd ed., University of Nebraska
Press).
49
H.R. REP. NO. 82-2503 (1952).
50
Id.
51
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 89-90.
52
Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (§ 7 repealed and reenacted as
amended 1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C §§ 13211326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 1360 note) PL 280 only provided for the mandatory
transfer of jurisdiction in five states: California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Wisconsin. Alaska was added in 1958.
48

325

American Indian Law Journal
III.

A.

[Vol. 5:308

ISDEAA: 638-ING FOR SURVIVAL AND SELFDETERMINATION

The Kennedy & Johnson Administrations: Testing the
Government Contracts Frame

In the late 1960s, against the backdrop of tribes losing their
federal recognition—and thus their lands, self-governance rights,
and members—tribal leaders launched an advocacy campaign that
was both desperate and bold. The American Indian Movement
(AIM) has been characterized as the “last great Indian battle,” and it
was certainly seen that way by the tribal advocates involved.53 As
Vine Deloria said at the time: “If we lose this one, there might not
be another.”54 With the very concept of Indian existence at stake,
tribal advocates worked to counter, not just the specific termination
and relocation policies destroying their communities, but also the
underlying philosophies motivating said policies. AIM’s
fundamental goal in their legislative activism was not to return to a
mystical past in the federal-Indian relationship where tribal
sovereignty was respected.55 Instead, AIM leaders sought to reimagine the entire federal-tribal relationship from the ground up.56
Tribal advocates knew they had to change the language used by both
the federal agencies and within their own documents.57 Although
tribal leadership began to use the language of self-governance and
self-determination in the context of federal law, they never
abandoned their demands for tribal sovereignty. They just
foregrounded the need for self-governance in a deliberate strategy
to gain allies.58
As the history described in section two demonstrates, federal
MARK TRAHANT, THE LAST GREAT BATTLE OF THE INDIAN WARS viii-xv
(2010).
54
See Deloria and Little, supra note 18, at 111. Mr. Deloria was a noted Native
American political theorist and philosopher who developed the bulk of the
political and policy reasoning behind AIM. His work continues to be a major
touchstone for scholars working on indigenous rights issues.
55
See VINE DELORIA & DAVID E WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, &
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS vii-xi (1999) (dismantling the idea that tribes
were ever viewed as sovereign equals).
56
See VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984).
57
See id. at 190-192 (describing the tribal strategy of using the language of selfdetermination to shift federal agency perceptions).
58
See generally, VINE DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN
MANIFESTO (1966) (arguing for a restructuring of the federal-tribal relationship).
53
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Indian law never had a legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty that
respected the full self-governance capacity of tribes. Tribal leaders
advocated for the recognition of Indian sovereignty rights and
articulated perfectly workable legal theories supporting tribal
sovereignty in nearly every hearing before Congress that they were
permitted to attend; but a doctrine of substantive tribal sovereignty
never materialized within federal statute and steadily disappeared,
even within case law. The American Indian Policy Review
Commission found that “there is substantial controversy
surrounding the concept of tribal sovereignty and the exercise of
governmental authority by the tribes within their reservation.”59
Further, they believed that the trend of federal court decisions “has
favored the tribes in their efforts to achieve good government within
the reservations.”60 However, even their hopeful analysis of the
court decisions found that tribes were forced to accept
“qualifications upon their sovereignty—such as extraterritorial
court jurisdiction—for the sake of receiving United States
protection, they relied upon remedies of small practical use.”61 The
American Indian Policy Review Commission further found that
even court support of tribal sovereignty ended with the 1871
congressional budget rider ending treaty-making with tribes.62
Faced with this legal reality, tribal leaders and their allies had to find
a different legal framework to support the self-governance and selfdetermination rights of tribal nations. They found it within the
relatively obscure provisions of government contracting.
One of the continuing critiques of federal Indian policy by tribal
leaders was their inability to manage their own lands, resources, and
programs. Any meaningful decision a tribe wanted to make had to
be approved, in writing, by the BIA.63 Thus, the goal of most tribal
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N., FINAL REPORT 4 (1977).
Id.
61
Id. at 54.
62
Id. at 59. The Commission, however, does not discuss the Kagama or Lone
Wolf decisions which upheld congressional acts encroaching upon the selfgovernance rights of tribes and effectively undermining the force of the
Cherokee line of cases. See also, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act of 1885 which
removed tribal jurisdiction over major crimes between AI/AN peoples on tribal
lands to federal court, effectively ending tribal court jurisdiction); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (affirming the ability of Congress to unilaterally
abrogate treat provisions as part of the congressional plenary powers, thus
placing such abrogation beyond judicial review).
63
“They [BIA officials] would sit in on any and all tribal meetings they felt like.
Anything that spent more than, say, 200 dollars, had to be approved by them.
59
60
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leaders was finding a way of wresting substantive decision-making
power and control—particularly over financial decisions—from the
federal agencies. Tribal leaders found that insisting upon the
sovereignty of Indian nations over their own lands and peoples was
not a tactic that provided concrete solutions to the problems facing
their communities; thus, they began to look for alternative methods
to achieve their goal.64 The fundamental problem with trying to
resolve the problems of control over programs, funding, and land,
revolved around the fact that federal law trumped tribal jurisdiction
even in the most generous of Supreme Court rulings.65 Tribal leaders
realized that they had to find a way of gaining control within the
legal framework of the United States if they were to limit
interference from the federal agencies.66
Until ISDEAA, the attempts by tribal leaders to retain, or regain,
control over tribal lands and governance had come through
arguments of tribal sovereignty—that as sovereign nations they had
the right to govern their territories without interference. After the
Kagama and Lone Wolf decisions, which upheld the plenary power
of Congress to make unilateral decisions regarding tribes and their
lands, sovereignty arguments looked fragile.67 Rather than retread
the path of the Indian Reorganization Act and try again to regain
control via a framework of secondary sovereignty within that of the
United States—a path that left tribes vulnerable to the whims of
Congress—tribal advocates argued that it was time to make United
Anything they didn't like 'went against the handbook' [referring to the BIA
Manual], which was kept in a vault so we could never see the damned thing.
That entire system had to go, Navajo leadership decided. It wasn't tenable.”
Telephone Interview with Eric Eberhard, Professor of Federal Indian Law at the
University of Washington School of Law and former legal counsel to the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs (Dec. 9, 2015) (explaining the pre-ISDEAA
process of tribal decision-making and BIA interference with tribal governance);
See also, Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1973) (ordering the BIA to make
accessible BIA manual and any other documents directing the internal
administration of the agency impacting the delivery of services).
64
Id. (stating, “We had to change the game.”).
65
See Deloria, supra note 55, at 156-163; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at
391-396; see further, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding
that treaty clauses, Indian commerce clause, and the general structure of
Constitution are sufficient grounds for upholding the “plenary and exclusive”
power of Congress over the tribes).
66
Survey of Conditions, supra note 42, at 227-301.
67
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1902).
has been partially rehabilitated as a holding defending the trust responsibility
between the federal government and the tribes in post-termination era court
holdings.
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States federal laws work for them. When the National Congress of
American Indians released the Declaration of Indian Purpose in
1961, tribal advocates reached out to the Kennedy Administration
with an innovative idea: use the government contracting process as
a mechanism for transferring control of federal funds from the
federal agencies to the tribes.68 They essentially argued for a block
grant program at least six years before the first national block grant
program—the Partnership for Health program of 1966—was
instituted.69 The Kennedy Administration was intrigued enough to
support a few demonstration projects through the BIA under the Buy
Indian Act, which began a series of limited procurement contracts to
tribal organizations.70
These demonstration projects then grew into a new series of selfgovernance demonstration projects under the Johnson
Administration that allowed the Navajo Nation and other large tribes
to begin taking over education on their reservations. By the time
President Nixon addressed Congress in 1970 and called for a pivot
away from the termination and relocation policies, tribes had been
running a series of successful self-governance contracts through
these demonstration projects.71 When Forrest Gerrard, legal counsel
to Senator Jackson, began to push the senator to develop a federal
plan that would open the way for self-governance
contracting/compacting for all tribes, the foundation had already
been well-established.72

Telephone Interview with Eric Eberhard, Professor of Federal Indian Law at
the University of Washington School of Law and former legal counsel to the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Nov. 11, 2015).
69
Id.
70
See THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS, 1961-1969 (2001). These demonstration projects
were also the first instances of tribal organizations wherein two or more tribes
form a non-profit (generally, though not always) to administer services across a
broader region that a single tribal territory. An example of a contemporary tribal
organization would be the California Rural Indian Health Board (CRIHB) which
provides health services for members of federally-recognized tribes in
California. CRIHB is the main tribal contracting organ for the Californian tribes.
The tribal organization allows the tribes to pool their 638 funds into a larger
financial base for health programs across California.
71
Id.
72
Forrest Gerrard was legal counsel to Senator Scoop Jackson, the chairman of
the Select Committee on Indian Affairs throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. Mr.
Gerrard was one of the principle architects of the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975 as well as a number of other pieces of Indian
Legislation. Eberhard, supra note 68; see also, Trahant, supra note 53.
68
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ISDEAA and the BIA & IHS Response: Problems with the
Procurement Contracts Frame

The initial passage of the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act in 1975 was met with resistance from both
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service. 73 The
BIA responded to tribal requests for contract negotiations with a sea
of red tape that effectively halted the self-governance ambitions of
all but the most determined of tribes—or those with the finances to
hire lawyers.74 The Indian Health Service insisted that ISDEAA
contracts could not possibly apply to tribes and refused to even
entertain the concept of tribal contracting/compacting.75 With the
federal agencies using the mechanisms of administrative law to
effectively gut the ISDEAA, tribal leaders went back to Congress.76
The prior history of the Kennedy and Johnson Administration
demonstration programs presented an unexpected problem for tribal
governments, namely that the procurement contracts framework
gave significant leverage to federal agencies during the negotiations
process.77 If tribal self-governance contracts were conceptualized as
procurement contracts, then the BIA had significant control over
negotiations, the contract scope, reporting requirements, and even
the tribes with whom the agency would enter contracts. Neither the
BIA nor IHS were malicious in their initial interpretation of the
ISDEAA; they were merely following a legal framework that had
already been set during the previous administrations and did not
appear to be overturned by the ISDEAA.78 The fact that government
procurement contracts happened to provide a great deal of leverage
Comm'r Ind. Aff., Ann. Rep., supra note 48.
Eberhard, supra note 68; Recommendations for Strengthening the Indian SelfDetermination Act, Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th
Cong. (1987) (the difficulty of obtaining permissions was a running theme
throughout tribal testimony).
75
Eberhard, supra note 68.
76
The agencies relied upon administrative law around procurement contracts to
refuse, unilaterally change, or end tribal self-governance
contracting/compacting. They also refused to enter into any form of negotiated
rule-making on the implementation and provisions of ISDEAA. This left the
tribes in the familiar, and upsetting, territory of having to guess at the inner
workings of the BIA and IHS as they could not access the internal handbooks
supposedly governing agency behavior.
77
Geoffry Strommer & Stephen Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of
Tribal Self-Governance under ISDEAA, 39 AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 16-18
(2014).
78
Id. at 20-22.
73
74
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and discretion to federal agencies during contracting was just a
happy accident. However, it did place tribal self-governance
contracting in a framework that still put federal agencies in the
position of dictating tribal policies—they just did it via contract
riders, reporting requirements, and a refusal to pay contract support
costs instead of agency mandates and oversight.79
C.

Procurement to Block Grants: Changing the Government
Contracting Frame

Tribal leaders successfully convinced Congress to pass a series
of strengthening amendments throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The
first was the 1984 Amendments, Public Law 98-250, which
exempted tribal self-governance contracting/compacting from the
Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act (Pub. L. 98-250).80
Public Law 98-250 also limited the ability of federal agencies to
force tribes to accept onerous reporting requirements.81 The 1984
Amendments, while deeply technical and on the surface focused on
the fine details of the contracting procedure, set the tone for further
amendments to ISDEAA. Rather than focus upon sweeping theories
of tribal self-determination, Congress focused upon specific
language fixes to ISDEAA that had, in practice, the effect of
transferring greater control over the entire contracting process into
tribal rather than agency hands.82
The 1988 Amendments significantly expanded the scope of
ISDEAA, directed the BIA and IHS to open all bureaus and
divisions to tribal self-governance contracting, and removed the

Eberhard, supra note 68; Senator Inouye specifically highlighted the
“agencies’ consistent failures over the past decade to administer selfdetermination contracts in conformity with the law,” in particularly the agencies’
failures to cede control to the tribes. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 37 (1987), as
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 2620, 2656; See also, U.S. Gov’t Accounting
Office, Still No Progress In Implementing Controls Over Contracts and Grants
with Indians, GAO-116394 (1981) (critiquing BIA failure to take GAO
recommended action from 1978 to provide necessary measures to turn over
agency functions to the tribes and ensure their smooth transition and operation).
80
See H. REP. No. 98-1071 (1984) (explaining the goals and intention of the
amendments).
81
Id.
82
See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 77 at 29; see further, S. Bobo Dean,
Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of Indian Tribal SelfDetermination, 36 TULSA L.J. 349, 350 (2000) (outlining the series of major
amendments to ISEAA).
79
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agency's ability to insert contract riders asserting agency control.83
Tribal leadership argued before Congress that the federal agencies
manipulated administrative law to avoid paying full contract support
costs and otherwise backed negotiated tribes into untenable
contracts.84 Philip Martin, Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians noted that:
Right now, the Federal Government and the tribal
governments are fighting for the same money that is
appropriated for them. So, there is a big conflict of
interest on the part of the BIA in carrying out the
Indian Self-Determination Act. We have had nothing
but problems the last 6 years with the BIA and IHS
in particular about indirect costs. So, I hope that
through these hearings some real amendments can be
made to make sure that the rights of the tribes to
contract and the rights of the tribe to receive adequate
administrative costs to conduct these programs be
given to the tribes, and that it is done in law so that
there can be no mistake about it, rather than just
putting these things vaguely into law, because the
BIA and the IHS are very good at twisting words
around to their own advantage.85
Mr. Martin's critique of BIA and IHS administrative policy was not
unique, nor was it the first time tribal leaders reported the federal
agencies using administrative law to throw up roadblocks to tribal
contracts.86 Congress responded by initiating the self-determination
Id.; see further Amending the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act to Provide further Self-Governance by Indian Tribes, S. REP. NO.
108-413, 108th Cong. (2003-2004).
84
25 U.S.C. § 450(m) (1984); 25 C.F.R §§ 900.240-245 (1986) (allowing federal
agencies to rescind a contract in whole or in part. Prior to the 1994
Amendments, this provision was left vague. BIA and IHS interpreted this
provision very broadly while at the same time interpreting funding provisions
quite narrowly, resulting in burdensome, underfunding contracts that set up
tribes to fail. The refusal of the agencies to pay full contract support costs is an
ongoing issue.).
85
Recommendations for Strengthening the Indian Self-Determination Act:
Hearing before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong, 100-250 (1987).
86
Id. at 26-28 (Mr. Red Owl, planning director of Sissheton-Wahpeton Sioux
Tribe, further reported that the federal agencies successfully used administrative
law to ensure that of every dollar of Congressional funding 85 cents stayed with
the agencies and 15 cents went to the tribes. He pointed to complexity of
procurement contracting—particularly when applied to the tribes—as part of the
issue. Mr. Martin, responding to a question from Chairman Inouye regarding
agency delays in processing tribal contract proposals further stated that: “In my
83
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demonstration program which directed the agencies to select 20
tribes to enter into self-determination compacts.87 These compacts
allowed tribes to not only assume control over federal programs, but
also allowed the tribes to restructure, shift finances, and re-organize
the priorities for those programs for which they compacted.88 These
self-determination compacts were far more in-line with tribal
expectations of self-governance contracting and met with significant
tribal interest.89 Between limiting the administrative power of the
agencies and developing the self-determination compacting
demonstration projects, Congress sent strong signals that it was
inclined to think of tribal self-governance contracts in broad terms.
The 1988 Amendments pushed ISDEAA contracting to look more
like modern Medicaid State Block Grants rather than limited
government procurement contracts.
At this time, Congress was ready to rethink the relationship
between the federal agencies and the tribes along these lines as they
were in the process of radically reforming the majority of the legal
framework around social welfare programs to transition planning
and authority from the federal agencies to the states themselves.90
Tribal advocates used the larger national debate around the scope of
federal authority to argue that the expansion of tribal selfgovernance contracts was a logical extension of the general
limitations being placed on federal power. Tribal advocates further
argued that the BIA and IHS, in contradiction to the Supreme Court
decision in Morton v. Ruiz and its descendants, relied upon internal
agency regulations that were not accessible by tribal governments.

judgment, one of the reasons why we have so many problems with contracts
with both agencies, BIA and IHS, is because they really don't have a contracting
management system in place. It's not a priority with them to be contracting with
tribes. So, when we make our proposals, they take their good old time. There is
no requirement, hardly, when they have to respond. There is no penalty in case
they don't carry out their agreement; there is no penalty on them.”).
87
Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No 100-472, § 209,
102 Stat. 2289, 2296-98 (Codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450f note (1988)), repealed by
Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260 § 10, Stat.
711, 734.
88
See M. Brent Leonhard, TRIBAL CONTRACTING: UNDERSTANDING AND
DRAFTING BUSINESS CONTRACTS WITH AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES AT 4345(2009) (explaining the federal statutes allowing for the shifting of tribal
finances); see also Strommer & Osborne, supra note 77.
89
See Comm'r Ind. Aff. supra note 48.
90
Eberhard, supra note 68; see further, S. REP. NO. 103-374 at 2 (1994)
(describing the 1988 amendments as necessary for dealing with the “excessive
bureaucracy” constraining tribal self-governance).
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The tribes advocated for a clarified contracting process that removed
the cloud of hidden bureaucratic rules to which they were not part
of making nor could even effectively refer.91 Congress agreed and,
as part of the 1988 amendments, directed the BIA and IHS to work
together through the new self-determination demonstration
programs to find a less burdensome contracting process.92
At first, the BIA and IHS worked closely with the tribes that they
identified to be “key stakeholders” in a preliminary negotiated
rulemaking process and developed a draft rule in late 1990.93 From
1990 until 1994, the two agencies continued to work on the final rule
without tribal consultation—this proved to be a mistake as tribal
reaction to the presented rule, when it was revealed via the Federal
Register, was overwhelmingly critical.94 During Congressional
oversight hearings, tribal advocates and leaders pointed to a two
year gap in any form of tribal consultation as evidence of BIA and
IHS unwillingness to consider seriously the self-governance rights
of tribal governments.95 Congress again agreed and amended
ISDEAA in 1994. As part of the 1994 amendments, Congress
directed the BIA and IHS to enter into negotiated rule-making with
the tribes pursuant to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,
Public Law 101-648.96 Congress further reiterated its determination
to support tribal self-governance and self-determination through the
contracting process—a process it desired to be unencumbered by

See S. REP. NO. 100-274; see further, Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton,
Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27
CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (1995).
92
S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 2 (1987); Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act: Hearing on Public Law 93-638 Before the Committee on Indian
Affairs, 100th Cong. at 2, 26-28 (1987).
93
Pub L. 93-638, Proposed Final Rule 1990, Findings. Interestingly the BIA and
IHS were among the first agencies to attempt a limited form of negotiated rulemaking under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-648 despite
their later hostility to any further negotiated rulemaking process.
94
The proposed regulation was published for comment on January 20, 1994 at
59 FR 3166. Almost every federally recognized tribe submitted criticism to the
proposed rule, as did most trial organizations. Tribal response to the proposed
rule ran over 80 pages in the federal register. There were very few, if any,
positive comments about the proposed rule anywhere in the 80 pages of
response.
95
As point of interest, every single tribe and tribal organization that had a 638
contract as of 1994 submitted a comment to the Federal Register in response to
the proposed rule. None of them were positive in their assessment. 59 FR 3166
(Jan. 20, 1994).
96
S. REP. NO. 100-274 at 20; Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of
1994, § 104(d) (1994).
91

2017]

The Master’s Tools

334

agency bureaucracy.97
The 1995-1996 negotiated rule-making on ISDEAA was one of
the defining moments not just for tribal self-governance contracting,
but also for the development of modern federal Indian law. It was
the first time the federal agencies entered into a negotiation process
in which they had to find a “unanimous concurrence among the
interests represented unless the committee agrees to define such
term to mean general but not unanimous concurrence,” rather than
making administrative rules unilaterally and then applying them to
the tribes.98 Tribes used the 1995-1996 negotiated rulemaking
process to address longstanding grievances with federal agency
treatment of tribal self-governance, and while most of those
concerns were set aside as outside the jurisdiction of the rulemaking
process, the Federal Register report reflected a deep current of
distrust.
Tribal representatives also indicated a concern that
absent formal rulemaking, Federal agencies might
use internal procedures to circumvent the policies
underlying the Act, thwarting the intent to simplify
the contracting process and free Indian tribes from
excessive Federal control. Two comments suggested
that negotiating rulemaking procedures will ensure
that Federal agencies would be bound to follow
uniform procedures to implement and interpret the
Act and regulations. Two other comments wanted the
regulation to state explicitly that the Secretaries lack
authority to interpret the meaning or application of
any provision of the Act or the regulations. Tribal
representatives feared that a myriad of letters
containing policy statements and correspondence
interpreting reporting requirements would result if
internal agency procedures are not tied to formal
rulemaking.99
Comments recorded within the federal register reflect tribal
concerns regarding administrative burdens, resistant agencies,
indirect costs, and the ability to shape administrative rules—but

Congressional Findings, Indian Self-Determination Act of 1988 Public Law
93-638.
98
59 Fed. Reg. 243, 249 (Dec. 29, 1994).
99
61 Fed. Reg. 122-32482 (Jan. 3, 1996).
97
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contained few appeals to tribal sovereignty.100 Tribal focus during
the 1995-1996 negotiated rulemaking process was on the
contracting process itself and wrestling as much control as possible
from the federal agencies. Tribal advocates used the canons of
contract law and theories of tribal self-governance, as articulated by
Congress, to whittle away at agency authority and jurisdiction. That
steady approach of using government contracts law to wrestle
control of funds, lands, and programs back to tribal governments
continues to guide tribal advocacy on ISDEAA amendments.101
D.

The Current Form of 638 Contracting/Compacting:
Ongoing Problems

Currently 638 contracting/compacting comes in two forms: Title
I self-governance contracting and Title V self-determination
compacting. Title I contracting is the foundation of ISDEAA and has
been the primary mechanism of tribal self-governance contracting
since 1975. While the process has been simplified multiple times as
described above, Title I contracting is still more restrictive than Title
V compacting.
Title I self-governance contracts are the most highly structured,
rigid mechanism for tribes to take over a federal program, and often,
the most onerous to conduct. In a Title I contract, a tribe must submit
yearly audits pursuant to the Single Agency Audit Act of 1984 as
well as submit to performance monitoring by the contracting
agency.102 Title I self-governance contracts are open to any federally
recognized tribe or tribal organization for any federal program or
service provided for the benefit of AI/AN tribes or individuals.103
Id.
Congress has continued to amend ISDEAA to clarify tribal self-governance
contracting and increase tribal control over their 638 contracts. See AMENDING
THE INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT TO
PROVIDE FURTHER SELF-GOVERNANCE BY INDIAN TRIBES, S. REP. NO. 108-413
(108th Cong. 2004); see further, Pub. L. 106-260 Indian Self-Determination Act
Amendments of 2000.
102
25 U.S.C. § 450l(c) (2017), 25 C.F.R. § 900.65 (2013); 25 U.S.C. §§
450l(c)(b)(7)(C) (2013).
103
25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1) (2017), 25 C.F.R. § 900.8 (2013) (while tribes have
attempted to initiate 638 contracts outside of the BIA and IHS for services
provided by Community Health Centers and other services they have thus far
been unsuccessful. ISDEAA and modern Indian statutes specifically recognize
tribal organizations—where two or more tribes enter into a contract or compact
for purposes of administering a 638 contract/compact to their combined
populations.).
100
101
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Tribes and tribal organizations that wish to enter into a Title I selfgovernance contract must send a proposal to the federal agency to
initiate negotiations. Funds under Title I contracts cannot be moved
to other programs, nor can the structure of the contract be changed
without a renegotiation.
Alternatively, Title V self-determination compacts are much
more flexible. Only tribes or tribal organizations that have
maintained a successful Title I contract for three years without
problems in their yearly audits are eligible to enter into a Title V
compact.104 Understandably, after almost fifty years of tribal selfgovernance contracting, nearly all tribes and tribal organizations that
desire to enter into tribal self-governance contracting have done
so.105 Under a Title V compact, a tribe may redesign or combine
compacts, reallocate or redirect funding, and restructure priorities
without seeking prior approval from the funding agency.106 Federal
agencies may only re-assume a Title V compact if (1) clear evidence
of gross mismanagement of funds transferred to the tribe or tribal
organization exist, or (2) if (a) a clear finding of imminent
endangerment of public health exist caused by an act or omission by
the tribe or tribal organization and (b) such endangerment arises out
of a failure to carry out the compact.107
Title V of the ISDEAA provides the greatest amount of
flexibility, independence, and control to a tribal organization as is
possible under the framework of government contracting. While
there are still limitations upon the abilities of the tribes to use
contracting funds as they see fit, Title V compacting provides the
best mechanism for tribes to take control of federal funds and use
those funds to govern themselves. Moreover, Title V compacting
allows a tribe or tribal organization to combine their own funds with
the compact without causing accounting issues or potentially having
those funds seized by the federal government should the
contracting/compacting agency re-assume the contract/compact.108
Of the problems that continue to haunt the implementation of the
ISDEAA, the failure of federal agencies to pay full contract support
costs is the one most frequently raised by tribes and tribal
25 U.S.C. § 458 aaa-2 (2017), 42 C.F.R. §§ 137.15-23 (2013).
Now Title I contracting is largely used by new tribal organizations formed by
two or more tribes who wish to enter into a shared 638 contract.
106
25 U.S.C. §§ 458 aaa-6(b)-(d) (2017), 43 C.F.T. §§ 137&131-150 (2013).
107
25 U.S.C. §§ 458 aaa-4 & 458 aaa-5(e) (2017), 42 C.F.R. 137.285 (2013).
108
25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-2(e) (2017); 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-4(b) (2013).
104
105
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organizations.109 Failure to pay full contract support costs threatens
the integrity of both Title I contracting and Title V compacting
because the tribes do not have the same resources to support the
administrative requirements for programs, but those fees are rarely
addressed, nor can they be easily addressed in a self-governance
contract/compact. Some tribes either chose not to engage in 638
contracts/compacts because of the uncertainty around contract
support costs, or chose to engage in 638 programs selectively based
upon the types of administrative costs the tribe could bear. 110 For
this reason, both the BIA and the IHS have tribes which are labeled
“direct service” or “self-governance.” In theory, this division is
internal to the agencies, and used to mark which departments handle
those tribal affairs. In practice, this division has often been used by
both federal agencies as a mechanism for determining funding
allocations.111 Thus, it has given rise to a misunderstanding of intratribal politics where an illusion of conflict exists between “direct
service” tribes and “self-governance” tribes on theories of
sovereignty.
In practice, nearly all tribes have entered into Title I or Title V
self-governance contracts/compacts; thus, all tribes are “selfgovernance” tribes. However, tribes strategically chose which
programs and services to 638 based on tribal priorities and capacity.
Those programs which a tribe elects to let remain with the federal
agencies are thus “direct service” programs. Therefore, all tribes
who have not 638-ed every federal program or service provided are
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 412 (2016)
(holding that the tribe has 6 years from the time a claim for self-determination
contract support costs initially arises to present such claim to a federal agency
owing such reimbursement. Further holding that a tribe cannot rely upon
equitable tolling to extend the time period unless such claims have been 1)
diligently pursued, and 2) there are extraordinary circumstances beyond the
tribe’s control preventing such timely presentation).
110
For example, Cherokee Nation has engaged in a long-term, strategic process
of 638 sections of the health care system providing health services to tribal
members both on and off the reservation. Much of tribal financial planning
revolves around decisions on where and when to 638 a program. See
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, FY 2016, Cherokee Nation Financial
Resources Group, available at
http://www.cherokee.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rj1lgepEeRY%3d&tabid=52
87&portalid=0&mid=5724.
111
See Dep’t of Health & Human Services Indian Health Service, Justification
of Estimate for Appropriations Committees FY 2017,
https://www.ihs.gov/budgetformulation/
includes/themes/newihstheme/documents/FY2017CongressionalJustification.pdf
.
109
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“direct service” tribes; consequently, all tribes are also “direct
service” tribes.112 The ability to freely choose whether or not to enter
into a self-governance contract is fundamental to the selfdetermination of tribal governments. Casting the division between
tribes that entered into a 638 contract versus a tribe that has not as a
fundamental difference on issues of tribal governance or tribal
sovereignty oversimplifies the political reality in which tribes find
themselves.
E.

The Choice to 638: Moments of Tribal Self-Determination

As noted above, the decision to 638 a program is a complex one.
A tribe may choose to 638 a part of a program—for example: a tribe
may (1) take over a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program while
keeping the inpatient hospital under IHS direct control; (2) choose
to enter into a regional consortium with other tribes and together
enter into a 638 compact/contract; or, (3) choose to 638 an entire
facility and its administration. A tribe may also elect not to 638 any
part of a program/service provided by a federal agency due to
administrative concerns. Each of these decisions are instances of
tribes exercising their self-governance rights and arguably a moment
of tribal sovereignty. However, the ISDEAA itself is not, and was
not, conceptualized as a mechanism of tribal sovereignty, but rather
one of protecting tribal self-governance via contracting.
Some of the confusion in the intent—and the legal doctrine that
ought to apply to ISDEAA—comes from the wealth of legislation
on Indian affairs that occurred from 1968 to 1977. Congress was
extremely active on Indian issues as it attempted to reverse the
devastation caused by termination and relocation era policies.113 The
courts have similarly actively been attempting to incorporate this
wealth of legislation into the broader legal framework of federal
Indian law and have developed a legal understanding of ISDEAA
that separates 638 contracting/compacting from other legal
doctrines concerning American Indians and Alaska Natives.114
But see, The President’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget for Native Programs,
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (Mar. 19, 2013).
113
See Pevar, supra note 18 at 1-17 (2012); COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1,
at 93-108.
114
One way of reading the Ramah line of cases is the Court’s attempt to square
hermeneutic circle of promoting tribal self-determination, as demanded by
ISDEAA, with the sheer amount of control granted to the federal agencies
through the framework of government contracting. Contract support costs seem
112
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638 CONTRACTING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

As discussed in Section II of this article, the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty within federal statute and case law is unclear, muddied
by the fragmentary nature of federal Indian policy, and challenged
by conflicting doctrines (like the plenary power doctrine). It is
unsurprising that tribal sovereignty, as a doctrine within United
States federal law, should be such a conflicted legal theory. As a
legal doctrine, tribal sovereignty essentially asks the courts to
protect, through the mechanisms of United States federal law, a right
which exists outside of the jurisdiction of the courts. If Congress
wishes to follow the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, then it must
reserve jurisdiction of issues—power—to the tribes themselves and
thus remove decision-making power from both itself and the states.
To a certain degree, Congress has demonstrated a willingness to do
so through the recognition of the validity of tribal courts, tribal
governments, and tribal legislation. However, that protection only
extends to removing the jurisdiction of the states over tribal
members and lands. Congress has never found Indian nations
beyond its reach, nor has the Court been willing to rebuke Congress
in the same fashion as it has rebuked states.115 The plenary powers
doctrine, thus far, has been a legal doctrine that overwhelms any
theory of tribal sovereignty when the two come into conflict.
The case law on tribal sovereignty is further complicated by the
trust doctrine—which asserts a special relationship between the
federal government and the tribes based on the continuing protection
of tribal interests by the United States federal government—as that
a random fight except when put in the context of both the economic necessity of
recouping those costs for the tribes and pushing back against federal control. See
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182 (2012); see further, Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 412 (2016).
115
Tribes at different points in time have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to strike
down or otherwise limit Congressional trespass on the sovereignty of Indian
nations. In each instance, the Court has upheld the ability of Congress—though
not always federal agencies—to interfere with tribal governance as it sees fit.
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding that commerce,
treaty clauses, and structure of Constitution are the basis for “plenary and
exclusive” power of Congress); see further, Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 556-558.; see
also, Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Antoine v
Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); see further, WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE
COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE TEN WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER
DECIDED 19 (2010) (discussing the fundamental point of dissonance in asking
the Western legal system to protect the sovereignty rights of tribes).
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doctrine places tribal governments in an inherently weaker
position.116 The trust doctrine has evolved considerably from the
Cherokee line of cases where the United States Supreme Court first
articulated it, but it remains one of the main pillars supporting tribal
sovereignty within federal Indian case-law. The fundamental theory
behind the trust responsibility is that the United States federal
government has taken upon itself “moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust” towards American Indians and Alaska
Natives, and that the “fulfillment of which the national honor has
been committed.”117 The trust responsibility has been used to justify
almost every shift in federal Indian policy, including termination, as
the standard for meeting the trust responsibility is extremely
flexible.
In modern case law, however, tribal advocates have used the
trust responsibility to support three major claims. First, the
preservation of tribal lands by entering lands 'into trust' such that
they become part of Indian Country; second, the continued federal
funding of Indian programs; and finally, the government-togovernment relationship between the United States federal
government and the tribes.118 The vagueness of the trust doctrine is
such that it provides useful ground for, not only tribal advocates, but
also their opponents. Courts have provided few standards for
determining whether or not a federal policy is in violation of the trust
responsibility, but they have consistently found that the federal

See supra note 23 for a brief discussion the Marshall Court's introduction of
the trust responsibility of the U.S. towards Indian nations. The trust doctrine is
an extremely complex legal doctrine within federal Indian law and a detailed
discussion of that doctrine goes beyond the scope of this paper. See e.g.,
Rebecca Tsosie, The Indian Trust Doctrine After the 2002-2003 Supreme Court
Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271 (2003); Mary C. Wood, Indian Land and the
Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 1471 (1994).
117
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983); see also, United States v.
Navajo Nation, 538 U.S. 488, 490 (2003) (finding a “general trust relationship”
between the federal gov’t and Indian tribes in which the federal gov’t must
move to protect Indian interests).
118
Entering lands into trust is one of the primary methods tribes have of
expanding their territories and thus jurisdiction. Lands in trust have limitations
upon them as the tribes cannot sell them or enter into certain property
arrangements without the permission of the Secretary of the Interior. However,
placing lands in trust is still one of the best ways to ensure tribal jurisdiction
over those lands. This process has unfortunately been complicated by recent
Supreme Court rulings and tribes are currently seeking a legislative fix from
Congress. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 380 (2009).
116
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government has a general fiduciary duty to the tribes. 119 Tribal
advocates have also successfully used the trust doctrine to obtain
legal remedies from the courts on violation of resource rights,120
proper management of income held in federal accounts,121 and tribal
sovereignty in general.122 On the other hand, the trust doctrine has
also used to limit tribal sovereignty and justify the termination era
policies.123 Moreover, locating tribal sovereignty within the trust
doctrine places tribal governments in an inherently subservient
position, a hierarchy of power that has been resisted by tribal
advocates.124
Despite the legislative and judicial assaults upon tribal
sovereignty and its tenuous position within case law, tribal
advocates have not stopped arguing for the recognition of the full
and substantive sovereignty of Indian tribes; however, they have
also diversified their legal strategies as demonstrated throughout this
article. A century of facing the steady erosion of tribal sovereignty,
self-governance rights, and control within the American legal
system led tribal leaders to reach outside the traditional legal
doctrines governing federal Indian law to look for innovative
protections.125 Tribal leaders have been effective navigators of both
the American legal and American political system in the defense of
their people, lands, and authority by manipulating whatever legal
doctrine possible to advance tribal interests. Thus, it is in keeping
with the adaptability of tribal advocates that they developed a theory
of tribal contracting within the larger body of government
contracting law in order to best protect tribal rights to selfdetermination.
It is not a mistake or misreading of the ISDEAA to approach
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983) (holding that applicable
statutes, regulations, treaties, and executive orders “define the contours of the
U.S. fiduciary responsibilities” to the tribes under the trust doctrine); see further,
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 736-738 (2011);
Rodgers v. United States, 697 Fed 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1983).
120
See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 537 U.S. 465, 468 (2003)
(protecting tribal land interest); see also Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 541
(9th Cir. 1995) (protecting tribal water rights); United States v. Eberhardt, 789
F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding the trust responsibility required the
federal gov’t to protect tribal fishing interest).
121
See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Loudner v.
United States, 108 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir 1997).
122
Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
123
Survey of Conditions, supra note 42.
124
See ECHO-HAWK, supra note 115; see further, Deloria, supra note 55.
125
See Pevar, supra note 18.
119
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638-contracting from within the framework of government
contracting because that was the original intent of tribal advocates
in designing the legislation, as demonstrated in section three. The
Supreme
Court,
thus
far,
has
resolved
ISDEAA
contracting/compacting cases under theories of contract without
reaching for legal doctrines related to federal Indian policy. 126 In
doing this, the Supreme Court has followed arguments made by
tribal advocates on ISDEAA.127 638 contracting/compacting is a
fundamental part of tribal self-determination, a federal policy which
the courts have upheld, but remains separate from tribal sovereignty,
which the courts have encumbered.
By arguing from within the framework of government
contracting and through the modern congressional policy of selfdetermination, tribal advocates have been able to win back
significant sectors of tribal control, free from the oversight of the
federal agencies.128 The President of the National Congress of
American Indians, Jefferson Keel, stated that the policy of selfdetermination has been an enormous success.129 However, President
Keel was careful to delineate the tribal theory of Indian
sovereignty—which is a full and substantive sovereignty that is not
minimized by the plenary powers doctrine—from that of selfdetermination as possible under ISDEAA.130 Tribal advocates
understand the speed at which legal doctrines regarding Indian
rights can turn against them and have been careful to maintain the
government contracting frame around 638 contracting/compacting
as demonstrated by their careful approach to the 1988, 1996, and
2000 amendments to ISDEAA.
Even without tribal advocates consistently working to maintain
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182, 187 (2012) (finding under
government contracting provisions that the federal agencies must pay tribal
governments and tribal organizations full contract support costs regardless of
funds appropriated by Congress).
127
See Testimony of Mr. Red Owl, supra note 86 at 21-22.
128
See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 634 (2005) (in
general, ISDEAA has been given a broad and liberal interpretation by the courts
with regard to what tribes can contract for and in limiting the scope of federal
agency interference); see also, Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.2d 1455,
1456 (10th Cir 1997); Ramah Navajo School Board v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338,
1340 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
129
Jefferson Keel, Op-ed., Sovereignty & Trust Responsibility-40 years of Tribal
Self-Determination, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 10, 2010),
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/keel-sovereignty-and-the-trustresponsibility-40-years-of-tribal-self-determination/.
130
Id.
126
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the government contracting frame,131 638 contracting/compacting
falls outside the doctrine of tribal sovereignty because it works
under the theory of Congressional delegation.132 Through ISDEAA,
Congress essentially delegated back to the tribe the provision of
services owed to them under the doctrine of the trust
responsibility.133 ISDEAA does not recognize tribal sovereignty, but
instead, the United States’ obligations to the tribes for services
guaranteed to them under treaty. 638 contracting/compacting
ensures that tribes maximize their control over how those services
are provided to them.134 Federal Indian policy has managed to divide
self-determination and self-governance from sovereignty when it
comes to the tribes. ISDEAA empowers the tribes regarding their
self-governance, but it does not strengthen their sovereignty because
the legal mechanisms providing that empowerment all flow from
doctrines related to federal responsibilities to the tribes. While the
courts have found that the federal government has a substantial
interest in empowering tribal self-sufficiency, self-governance, and
economic development,135 they have thus far not found that the
federal government has a similar interest in promoting tribal
sovereignty.136 The fact that 638 contracting/compacting language
revolves around self-determination and self-governance rather than
sovereignty is not an oversight nor a mistake, but a deliberate choice.
V.

CONCLUSION

The courts have not erred by resolving issues arising out of
ISDEAA through contract law, nor has Congress erred in treating
ISDEAA as a mechanism of tribal self-determination, but not tribal
sovereignty. Indeed, tribal advocates have been adamant before the
courts and Congress that what tribes desire from ISDEAA is that
they are to be treated as contractors with the full rights and
protections normally. Tribal advocates have shifted the
Congressional
vision
of
the
full
scope
of
638
See Ramah, 567 U.S. at10-11.
Supra note 17.
133
Id.
134
See Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631.
135
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987).
136
One could argue that the courts have not even found that the federal gov’t
must be respectful of tribal sovereignty, only the states, as the courts have used
both the plenary power doctrine and the preemption doctrine to shut down state
attempts to legislate on tribal lands.
131
132
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contracting/compacting, as detailed in section three, but have not
moved away from that general frame because it provides another
avenue for protecting tribal interests without necessarily invoking
Indian law doctrines that may be problematic. The government
contracting frame has its own problems, as demonstrated by the
ongoing conflict over contract support costs, but those issues are
new to the debates around federal Indian policy for the tribes. The
government contracting frame provides new ground to visit old
problems. Thus, under ISDEAA, the issues regarding interference
from federal agencies, the full funding of Indian programs, and the
empowerment of tribal self-governance can be approached from
new angles. Fighting the paternalism of federal agencies is an old
battle for the tribes, but under ISDEAA, it becomes a new discussion
that has provided significantly better remedies than previous
attempts to reclaim tribal self-governance.
Approaching ISDEAA from the perspective that it either (1)
reduces the tribes to government contractors, or (2) is somehow a
mechanism of tribal sovereignty ignores the deliberate strategy on
the part of tribal leaders and advocates to manipulate the
government contracting frame. It is sometimes difficult to discern
the legal and legislative strategies of the tribes, but in the drafting
and evolution of ISDEAA, the choice by tribal leaders to build upon
the government contracting framework in ISDEAA has been quite
clear. The tribes have been active and aggressive actors in the
evolution of 638 contracting/compacting, and innovative in its use.
It is necessary to understand what has been the general strategy of
the tribes towards ISDEAA if we are to understand how 638
contracting/compacting will continue to develop. Since 1968, tribal
advocates have steadily sought to increase the legal avenues
available to them in order to expand and protect tribal selfdetermination and control. Not all actions by the tribes should be
considered within the frame of tribal sovereignty or seeking to
expand tribal sovereignty because that ignores the innovations and
adaptability of the tribes.
Control has been the goal of tribal advocates since the
termination and relocation era—control over (1) federal funding, (2)
programs to American Indians and Alaska Natives, (3) tribal lands,
and (4) tribal people. Another way of interpreting Vine Deloria's
famous statement that “there might not be another” battle over the
rights of tribes to have control over their own destiny could be that

345

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

the tribes will not allow control to be wrestled away from them in
such a manner again. 638 contracting/compacting is not an act of
tribal sovereignty—at least as the tribes themselves have understood
their own sovereignty—but is demonstrably an act of tribal control.
While the courts have been content to define tribal sovereignty as a
footnote to the sovereignty of the United States, the tribes
themselves have never stopped demanding full and substantial
sovereignty over their own lands on par with the sovereignty of the
United States. To conflate 638 contracting/compacting with tribal
sovereignty is to turn a deaf ear to those demands.
To understand ISDEAA as an expression of tribal sovereignty
accepts the idea that the sovereignty of Indian nations is lesser than
other nations, which is an idea the tribes have rejected time and time
again. 638-ing is a hedge, a fail-safe, for tribes to maintain their selfdetermination and self-governance rights while at the same time
continuing to argue for their sovereignty rights. Further, conflating
tribal self-governance contracting with tribal sovereignty obscures
the depths of the tribal demand for sovereignty. ISDEAA has been
enormously successful. Since its implementation, tribes have
drastically increased their self-governance capacity, and by doing
so, have increased their ability to make demands for the recognition
of their sovereignty; regardless, the ISDEAA is not a mechanism of
tribal sovereignty.

